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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a novel scheme for data
hiding in the fingerprint minutiae template, which is the most
popular in fingerprint recognition systems. Various strategies are
proposed in data embedding in order to maintain the accuracy
of fingerprint recognition as well as the undetectability of data
hiding. In bits replacement based data embedding, we replace the
last few bits of each element of the original minutiae template
with the data to be hidden. This strategy can be further improved
using an optimized bits replacement based data embedding,
which is able to minimize the impact of data hiding on the
performance of fingerprint recognition. The third strategy is
an order preserving mechanism which is proposed to reduce
the detectability of data hiding. By using such a mechanism, it
would be difficult for the attacker to differentiate the minutiae
template with hidden data from the original minutiae templates.
The experimental results show that the proposed data hiding
scheme achieves sufficient capacity for hiding common personal
data, where the accuracy of fingerprint recognition is acceptable
after the data hiding.
Index Terms—fingerprint, minutiae template, data hiding,
privacy protection
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, biometrics such as fingerprint, face and iris are
widely used in authentication systems. Usually, biometrics
need to be stored in a database for subsequent authentication.
However, templates stored in the database are at the risk of
being stolen or modified. Once the templates are stolen, it is
difficult to be replaced like passwords. Meanwhile, the user’s
private information (e.g., name, address, bank account number
and etc.) associated with the stolen template would also be
leaked. Thus, it is of paramount importance to protect the
privacy of biometrics data.
The simplest way to protect the biometric template is using
cryptography that aims at encrypting data into some infor-
mation meaningless to unauthorized parties. The encrypted
template is protected as long as the decryption key is se-
cure. However, cryptography is not the best way to protect
the biometric template due to the non-smooth property of
the encryption functions, which cannot handle the intra-class
variability. Any little difference in the biometric template could
make a significant change in the encrypted template. Thus, it
is not possible to perform the biometric matching directly in
the encrypted domain, a correct decryption of the encrypted
template is necessary before every matching attempt.
In recent years, significant efforts have been put in devel-
oping specific protection techniques for biometric template,
which can be classified into three major categories including:
1) Cancelable biometrics generation: transforms a bio-
metric signal or template to another domain using a
transformation function. The biometric matching can be
performed directly on the transformed templates with
little or no degradation of the matching performance.
The transformation can be further classified into non-
invertible transformation [1]–[3] and biohashing [4]
based on the property of the transformation function.
In non-invertible transformation, a key or password is
used to guide the transformation function. In biohashing,
the transformation function depends on an user specific
pseudo-random projection matrix.
2) Biometric cryptosystem: aims at creating a crypto-
graphic key for the biometric template. In biometric
cryptosystem, some helper data is stored in association
with the user identity. The helper data is usually a com-
bination of the template and a key as well as some other
information, which should not expose any important
information of the template. It should be difficult to
recover the original biometric template or extract the key
from the helper data. Biometric matching is carried out
by checking the validity of the key extracted from the
query biometric data with the corresponding helper data.
The biometric cryptosystem can be further classified into
fuzzy commitment [5] and fuzzy vault [6]–[8] based on
whether the technique is able to handle point set features.
3) Biometrics Data hiding: conceals personal data on a
cover biometric template [9], [10]. To hide the secret
into the template, one needs to imperceptibly alter the
value of the pixels in the template. While the location
of these pixels is usually dependent on a key. In such a
way, the secret and the biometric template is combined
together, which still appears as an image. The template
with hidden secret is visually similar as the original
template, so it can be used directly for the biometric
matching.
Despite the relative high security provided by the cancelable
biometrics generation and the biometric cryptosystem, they
inevitably destroy the structure of the biometrics template. The
protected template generated by these two types of schemes
are noise like, which can be easily differentiated from the
original templates. This may lead to the attacker’s interest for
cracking the protected template [11], [12]. For biometrics data
hiding, however, it is able to preserve the main feature of the
biometrics template. The protected template with hidden secret
is difficult to be differentiated from the original templates.
People have proposed various biometrics data hiding tech-
niques in literature, most of which are designed for image
level biometrics templates including the color image, grayscale
ar
X
iv
:1
71
0.
00
51
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
 O
ct 
20
17
2image and the binary image. In this paper, we focus on
developing data hiding techniques to protect the privacy of
fingerprint templates. Instead of working on the fingerprint
images, we investigate the possibilities to hide data in the
fingerprint minutiae (termed as minutiae for short) which is the
most popular fingerprint feature. Concretely, three strategies
are proposed for data hiding in minutiae template. In the first
strategy, we simply alter the minutiae locations and directions
by replacing their last few bits with the data to be embedded.
In the second strategy, the alteration is performed such that its
impact on the fingerprint recognition accuracy is minimized.
To reduce the detectablity of data hiding, we also propose
an order preserving mechanism to maintain the order of the
minutiae points stored in the minutiae template, so that it is
difficult for the attacker to differentiate our protected minutiae
template from the original minutiae templates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the related work regarding the fingerprint data
hiding. In Section III, we briefly explain the format of the
minutiae template. The details of our proposed method for
data hiding in the minutiae templates are elaborated in Section
IV, followed by the experimental results and conclusions in
Section V and Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In literature, various data hiding approaches are proposed
for the protection of fingerprint templates. Ratha et al. [13]
propose a method to hide data in Wavelet Scale Quantization
(WSQ) compressed fingerprint image. In data embedding,
some high frequency quantized coefficients are chosen ran-
domly based on a seed related to the image content. The least
significant bit (LSB) of a chosen coefficient is forced to be
equal to the hidden bit. In data extraction, the same seed is
determined from the content of the image. Data is extracted
according to the LSBs of the randomly chosen high frequency
quantized coefficients. An improvement of this method is
given in [12], where the random seed not only relates to the
image content but also the knowledge (i.e., password). So even
the attacker knows the data hiding method, he is not able to
properly hide the message. In [12], the authors also point out
that a secure system should not give the impression to the
attacker that the system is using a data hiding technique. Thus,
they randomly change the LSBs of the coefficients which are
not used in data embedding, so as to reduce the detectability
of the data hiding technique used in the system. Such an
operation will make the statistics of the stego-fingerprint image
(i.e., the fingerprint image with hidden data) nearly the same as
an original fingerprint image, so the possibility for the attacker
to detect the existence of secret data is reduced.
Gunsel et al. [14] introduce two data hiding schemes for
grayscale fingerprint image in spatial domain. The first method
inserts a watermark into the fingerprint image after feature
extraction, where watermark embedding does not modify
the pixels belong to the fingerprint feature region such as
bifurcation or endpoint areas. The second method embeds
data into the fingerprint image before feature extraction. In
this method, watermark embedding is performed by preserving
the gradient orientation near a watermark embedding location,
i.e., the change of gradient orientation is within a certain
range during the watermark embedding. These two schemes
are not practically useful due to the extremely low data hiding
capacity. For a 256×256 grayscale fingerprint image, the
capacity of the first method and the second method is 156
bits and 12 bits, respectively.
Based on what has been done in [14], Jain et al. [15], [16]
propose to apply data hiding techniques on biometrics for two
scenarios, i.e., secure communication and biometrics authen-
ticity enhancement. In scenario 1, the fingerprint minutiae that
requires to be transmitted is hidden into a cover image for
secure communication, where the cover image could be any
image. In scenario 2, the eigen-face coefficients are hidden into
a grayscale fingerprint image for enhancing the authenticity
of the fingerprint and face. During the enrollment, the eigen-
face coefficients are extracted from the user’s face image and
hidden into his grayscale fingerprint image. The grayscale
fingerprint image with the hidden data will be stored in the sys-
tem database or on a smart card. In the authentication, both the
face and fingerprint images of the user are needed for query.
The system extracts the hidden eigen-face coefficients from
the stored fingerprint image. The authentication is successful
if the extracted eigen-face coefficients can be matched with
the query face image, meanwhile, the stored fingerprint image
has to be matched with the query fingerprint. To preserve the
crucial features of the fingerprint, the value of the pixels in
fingerprint minutiae area or ridge region are fixed during data
embedding. However, the fingerprint matching accuracy is still
slightly degraded after data embedding.
Motivated by [15], [16], a lot of data hiding schemes
are proposed to embed some additional biometric data into
the fingerprint image to increase the security or protect the
integrity of the latter [17]–[19]. Vatsa et al. [17] propose
to embed facial features into a fingerprint image in Discrete
Wavelet Transform (DWT) domain to protect the face and fin-
gerprint from tempering. Data is embedded in the second LSBs
of some selected DWT coefficients. This method provides
some robustness against geometric and frequency attacks.
However, the fingerprint matching accuracy before and after
data embedding are not reported. Noore et al. [18] propose to
embed both the demographic text data and the face features
into a fingerprint for protecting the integrity of the fingerprint
image. The demographic text data contains common personal
information such as name, ID and gender. In the proposed data
hiding scheme, data is embedded in the selected fingerprint
texture regions in DWT domain. As the texture regions may
not be the same before and after data embedding, 100%
extraction accuracy is not guaranteed in this scheme. In [19], a
phase-encoding-based watermarking scheme for protecting the
fingerprint is proposed. Some one-dimensional Fourier phase
features are extracted and hidden in the fingerprint itself to
achieve self-authentication. Data embedding is conducted on
the Fourier phase domain by a phase-shift key modulation
based spread spectrum embedder. The capacity of this scheme
is quite limited, experimental results show that only 30 bits
can be hidden into a 300×480 grayscale fingerprint image to
guarantee 100% watermark extraction accuracy.
3The above mentioned techniques are designed for the com-
pressed or raw grayscale fingerprint images, which do not
work for binary fingerprint images. In [20] and [10], the
authors develop two data hiding schemes for the thinned
fingerprint template, which is a binary fingerprint image after
thinning. The thinned fingerprint maintains all the key features
of a fingerprint and is much smaller in file size compared
with its grayscale counterpart. In addition, extracting minutiae
features from a thinned fingerprint is much faster. The method
proposed [20] is a lossless data hiding scheme which is capable
of reconstructing the original thinned fingerprint after data
embedding. In this scheme, data is hidden inside the thinned
fingerprint by adding some boundary pixels in the thinned
fingerprint. The newly produced boundary pixels can be iden-
tified and removed to recover the original thinned fingerprint,
so that the fingerprint matching accuracy is not affected after
data embedding. In [10], a steganographic scheme is proposed
for the thinned fingerprint template, which is able to reduce
the detectablity of data hiding technique. In this scheme, data
is embedded by exchanging suitable pixels in the thinned
fingerprint template according to some rules. No boundary
pixels will be produced in such embedding process. Thus, it
is difficult for the attacker to identify the thinned fingerprint
template with hidden data.
All the existing fingerprint data hiding schemes are devel-
oped for fingerprint templates in the image level (i.e., grayscale
or binary images). As a matter of fact, most of the fingerprint
recognition systems only store fingerprint features for the sake
of storage and speed. It is necessary and important to develop
suitable data hiding techniques for the feature level fingerprint
template. To the best of our knowledge, we are unable to
disclose any literature that is developed for data hiding in
fingerprint templates in the feature level. In this paper, we
propose a data hiding scheme for the fingerprint minutiae tem-
plate which is the most popular fingerprint features. Different
mechanisms are incorporated such that the impact of the data
embedding on the fingerprint recognition is minimized and the
the detectablity of data hiding is reduced.
III. THE FINGERPRINT MINUTIAE
The fingerprint minutiae records the detailed features of
a fingerprint. It represents various ways that the fingerprint
ridges meets or ends. Typically, a ridge can suddenly come to
an end to get a ridge ending, or be divided into two ridges
which results to a bifurcation. The fingerprint minutiae are the
most popular features in fingerprint recognition. The American
National Standards Institute [21] classifies the minutiae into
four types including the ridge ending, the ridge bifurcations,
compound (trifurcation or crossovers), and type undetermined.
The FBI minutiae-coordinate model [22] considers only ridge
endings and bifurcations, which is widely adopted in the
minutiae template. In this model, each minutiae is represented
in three fields including
1) The x-coordinate (horizontal) of the location.
2) The y-coordinate (vertical) of the location.
3) The minutiae direction which is angle between the tan-
gent to the ridge line at the minutiae and the horizontal
axis.
 
Fig. 1. A ridge ending (left) and a bifurcation (right) extracted from a real
fingerprint. (x, y) refers to the horizontal and vertical coordinate of the
minutiae, and θ is the direction of the minutiae.
Fig. 2. Illustration of a minutiae template extract from a full fingerprint image.
Left: the fingerprint image with the minutiae overlapped, right: the minutiae
template.
Fig. 1 shows a ridge ending and a bifurcation of a real
fingerprint. An illustration of the minutiae template extracted
from a full fingerprint image is shown in Fig. 2.
In this paper, the minutiae template are generated based on
the FBI minutiae-coordinate model. Let’s denote the minutiae
of a fingerprint images as M = {(xi, yi, θi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N},
where N is the number of minutiae points, (xi, yi) is the
coordinate (i.e., location) of each minutiae point and θi is
the corresponding direction. In general, a minutia template
stores all these minutiae based on the ascending order of xi,
as shown in Table I.
IV. THE PROPOSED METHOD
A. The system
Motivate by the system proposed in [10], [16], we intro-
duce here a minutiae based fingerprint recognition system
which incorporates data hiding for the privacy protection. Fig.
3 illustrates the block diagram of the system. During the
enrollment, the user’s identity or other private information
are embedded into his minutiae template using our proposed
scheme. The template with hidden information are then stored
in a database. In authentication, an input fingerprint will
be matched against all the minutiae templates stored in the
database. If the fingerprint matching is successful, the hidden
private user information will be extracted from the matched
minutiae template for further process or other applications. In
such a system, when the database is stolen, the attacker will
only have a bunch of minutiae template without any other
4TABLE I
THE DATA STORED IN A MINUTIAE TEMPLATE
index x-coordinate y-coordinate direction (in degrees)
1 43 152 236
2 43 185 236
3 46 141 225
4 46 125 214
5 47 114 56
6 48 229 225
... ... ... ...
useful information associated. It would be difficult for the
attacker to illegally use the stolen minutiae templates.
B. Data embedding
1) Bits replacement: We consider a cover minutiae tem-
plate which contains three different fields including the x-
coordinate, y-coordinate, and the direction. Each field has N
cover elements with N as the number of minutiae points. The
bits replacement based data embedding is performed field by
field, where each field is treated equally. For simplicity, we
denote gi as the ith of the N cover elements in a certain
field. During the data embedding, we embed b secret bits into
each cover element gi by replacing the least b significant bits
of gi with the secret bits. The element with hidden data can
be computed as
zi = 2
b
⌊
gi
2b
⌋
+ d , (1)
where d = d0 × 20 + d1 × 21 + ... + db × 2b are the
decimal value of the b-bits secret information.
2) Optimized bits replacement: The problem of the bits
replacement based data embedding is that it changes the
locations and directions too much when multi-bits (i.e., b > 1)
secret is embedded into each element. This will significantly
reduce the fingerprint recognition accuracy after the data
embedding. To mitigate this issue, we propose a optimized
bits replacement data embedding scheme in this section.
Given b bits of secret (in terms of a decimal vale of d) to
be embedded into the cover element gi, we first compute a
pair of embedding parameters p and q, where
p = |gi − [2b
⌊
gi
2b
⌋
− (2b − d)]| (2)
and
q = |gi − (2b
⌊
gi
2b
⌋
+ d)| (3)
The element after data embedding is then computed as
zi =
{
2b
⌊
gi
2b
⌋
+ d, if p ≥ q
2b
⌊
gi
2b
⌋− (2b − d), if p < q . (4)
This algorithm takes into account two strategies of the bits
replacement for the cover element. For example, when em-
bedding the secret bits “11” (i.e., d=3) into the cover element
“1100” (i.e., gi in the form of bits), there are following two
strategies to modify gi:
1) Change gi to “1111” by adding d = 3;
2) Change gi to “1011” by subtracting 22 − d = 1.
For the first strategy (i.e., the bits replacement), the difference
between the cover element before and after the data embedding
is 3, which is only 1 for the second strategy. In our optimized
bits replacement, we determine the suitable data embedding
strategy for each single element based on the data to be
embedded. This is able to reduce the impact of data embedding
on fingerprint recognition.
3) Order preserving: As what we have mentioned in Sec-
tion III, the minutiae template usually stores each minutiae
points according to the ascending order of the x-coordinate.
This may not be the case after the data embedding, where the
order of x-coordinates may be disturbed due to the modifica-
tion of the x-coordinates. Let take the 4th and 5th minutiae
points stored in the minutiae template given in Table III as an
example. We embed secret “10” into the x-coordinate of the
4th minutiae point and secret “01” into the x-coordinate of the
5th minutiae point. According to Eq. (4), the x-coordinate of
the 4th and 5th minutiae points will be changed to 46 and 45
after such data embedding. This creates the anomaly in the
minutiae templates with hidden data. Such anomaly can be
easily noticed and detected by the attacker.
To reduce the detectablity of the data hiding, we propose
in this section an order preserving mechanism during the data
embedding. For each element, if the inequality
zi ≥ zi−1, (5)
holds after the data embedding using Eq. (4), we proceeds to
the next element for data embedding. Otherwise, we revise zi
into
z′i = zi + l2
b, (6)
where l ≥ 1 is an integer which is computed by
l = argmin
l
(z′i − zi). (7)
This mechanism preserves the order of the x-coordinates of
the minutiae template before and after the data embedding. It
would be difficult for an attacker to differentiate the protected
minutiae template (i.e., the one with hidden data) from the
original minutiae templates.
The data embedding steps can be summarized as follows
by taking account all the possible strategies.
1) Choose one element from each field of the minutiae
template sequentially.
2) Embed b secret bits into the element using the bits
replacement based data embedding (see Eq. (1)) or the
optimized bits replacement based data embedding (Eq.
(4)).
3) Adopt the order preserving mechanism when necessary.
4) Proceed to the next element until all the elements are
processed.
C. Date extraction
Regardless of the strategies incorporated in data embedding,
the secret data can be extracted based on the last b bits of each
element from the minutiae template with hidden data, the steps
of which can be formulated below.
5Minutiae 
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Fig. 3. The minutiae based fingerprint recognition system incorporating data hiding.
1) Choose one element from each field of the minutiae
template based on the same sequence as that of the data
embedding.
2) Extract the last b bits of the value of the element as the
secret bits.
3) Proceed to the next element until all the elements are
processed.
4) Concatenate all the secret bits extracted from each ele-
ment.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Our experiments are evaluated on the FVC2002 DB1 a
database, which contains 800 grayscale fingerprint images
from 100 fingers with 8 impressions per finger. The algorithms
(MINDTCT and BOZORTH3) provided by the NIST Biomet-
ric Image Software (NBIS) [23] are used for minutiae extrac-
tion and matching. We extract 800 original minutiae templates
from the database using MINDTCT with the boundary minu-
tiae points removed. We perform the proposed data embedding
into these minutiae templates with different settings of b. For
simplicity, the templates with hidden data are termed as the
protected template. For each protected template, the amount of
data that is hidden is 3bN bits, where N refers to the number
of minutiae points. Thus, we obtain different sets of protected
templates corresponding to different b, each of which contains
800 protected templates.
To evaluate the impact of data hiding on the fingerprint
recognition accuracy. We treat the protected template as
the template stored in the database. The original minutiae
templates extracted from the other impressions of the same
finger are treated as the minutiae for authentication. In to-
tal, there are seven such original template for each finger.
To compute the false rejection rate (FRR), we match each
of the protected templates against the other seven original
impressions (templates) of the same finger. This gives us
(8 × 7) × 100 = 5600 genuine matches. To compute
the false rejection rate (FRR), the 100 first impressions of
the protected templates are matched against each other, which
produces (100× 99)/2 = 4950 imposter matches.
The performance of the fingerprint recognition for different
sets of protected fingerprints as well as the original minutiae
template are shown in Fig. 4, where the successful match rate
equals to 1−FRR and the protected templates are generated
based on the optimized bits replacement and order preserving.
It can be seen that when b = 4 bits are embedded, which
indicates that 4 bits are embedded into each element of the
minutiae template, the successful match rate drops seriously.
In general, the accuracy of the fingerprint recognition remains
high when b < 4.
To verity the effectiveness of the optimized bits replace-
ment, we further compare the accuracy of the fingerprint
recognition using the optimized bits replacement and the bits
replacement in Fig. 5, where the order preserving mecha-
nism is applied for both schemes. Obviously, the optimized
bits replacement performs better in terms of the fingerprint
recognition. Generally speaking, when more bits are embedded
into one element, more improvement will be gained using the
optimized bits replacement based data hiding with respect to
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Fig. 5. The performance of fingerprint recognition after bits replacement
based data hiding and optimized bits replacement based data hiding.
that using bits replacement based data hiding. At FAR= 10−4
and b = 2, the successful match rate using the optimized
bits replacement based data hiding is about 1% higher than
that using the bits replacement. This will be increased to over
5% when b = 3. Fig. 6 lists some examples of the original
minutiae templates and the corresponding protected templates
obtained based on the optimized bits replacement and order
preserving. It can be seen that the protected templates are
visually similar to the original minutiae template, which are
difficult to be differentiated.
The capacity of our proposed data hiding scheme varies
among different minutiae templates. A minutiae template with
more minutiae points available is able to hide more secret bits.
The statistics of the number of minutiae points of each finger
in FVC2002 DB1 a is given in Table II. If we set b = 3 for
the data embedding, the average capacity is 3×3×33 = 297
bits, which is sufficient for hiding common personal data such
as the user name, personal key and so on.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a novel scheme is proposed for data hiding
in the fingerprint minutiae template. In this scheme, three
strategies are proposed to maintain the accuracy of fingerprint
recognition as well as the undetectability of the minutiae tem-
plates, including the bits replacement based data embedding,
the optimized bits replacement base data embedding and the
order preserving mechanism. In bits replacement based data
embedding, the last few bits of each element in the minutiae
template are replaced with the data to be hidden. This can
be further improved using the optimized bits replacement
based data embedding, where the replacement is performed
TABLE II
STATISTICS OF THE NUMBER OF MINUTIAE POINTS OF EACH FINGER IN
FVC2002 DB1 A
minimum maximum average
Number of minutiae points 11 92 49
such that its impact on fingerprint recognition is minimized.
The order preserving mechanism is proposed to reduce the
detectability of data hiding, which creates challenges for the
attacker to identify the protected template with hidden data.
We show in the experiments that the proposed scheme is able
achieve sufficient capacity for hiding common personal data.
Meanwhile, the performance of the fingerprint recognition is
not seriously affected.
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